The Impact of Competition from Venture Capitalists on Corporate Venturing Investment by Bade, Marco
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance 
Volume 22 
Issue 1 Summer 2020 Article 3 
July 2020 
The Impact of Competition from Venture Capitalists on Corporate 
Venturing Investment 
Marco Bade 
Technische Universität Berlin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Corporate Finance 
Commons, Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons, and the Finance and Financial 
Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bade, Marco (2020) "The Impact of Competition from Venture Capitalists on Corporate Venturing 
Investment," The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance: Vol. 22: Iss. 1, pp. -. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol22/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graziadio School of Business and Management at 
Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance by an 
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
Katrina.Gallardo@pepperdine.edu, anna.speth@pepperdine.edu. 
The Impact of Competition from Venture Capitalists on Corporate Venturing 
Investment 
Cover Page Footnote 
The author would like to thank the editor James C. Brau for handling the paper, and the anonymous 
referee for his/her helpful feedback. The author also thanks Prof. Dr. Hans Hirth for valuable suggestions. 
This article is available in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol22/
iss1/3 
THE JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE  VOLUME 22, NO. 1 (SUMMER 2020) 61-77 
 
Copyright © 2020 Pepperdine Digital Commons and the Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance. 
All rights reserved.  ISSN: 2373-1761.  
The Impact of Competition from Venture Capitalists 
on Corporate Venturing Investment 
 
Marco Bade 
Technische Universität Berlin, Germany 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study proposes a model on corporate venturing (CV) investment and examines the impact of venture 
capital (VC) activity in the economy on CV firms’ investment. The presence of VCs creates competition 
for entrepreneurs. This reduces CV firms’ expected venturing returns, and thus gives rise to a financial 
disincentive to CV investment. The empirical prediction of this result is that competition for talent should 
decrease CV investment. This prediction contradicts previous statements in the theoretical literature on 
CV.   
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I. Introduction 
“In the past, corporate interest in creating venture funds tended to wax and wane 
in sync with the general VC climate” (Lerner 2013, p. 88). Corporate venturing1 (CV) 
and venture capital (VC) activity went hand in hand through cyclical boom phases in the 
late 1960s, mid-1980s, and late 1990s (Bettignies and Chemla 2008, Dushnitsky 2011, 
Gompers 2002, Gompers and Lerner 1998). In the financial crisis years 2011 and 2012, 
this longstanding fact has changed (Lerner 2013). In Europe, for instance, the deal value 
(deal count) of CV activities has risen by 59 percent (15 percent), whereas VC 
fundraising has fallen by 5 percent (12.5 percent) in those years. In the most recent years, 
both are rising again in terms of deal volumes. However, growth in the CV sector is 
stronger (e.g., Pitchbook 2019). The very close link of the past decades appears to be 
interrupted by new effects. Given the novelty of this development, there is a research 
 
 
 
1 This study adopts the Bettignies and Chemla’s (2008, p. 505) definition of CV. They “… define corporate 
venturing as the financing and development of new business ventures by large established companies, 
either inside (intrapreneurship) or outside (corporate venture capital) the corporate structure”. 
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gap in academic literature on CV. There is no scholarly approach to explain (temporary) 
opposing trends in CV investment and VC activity.  
This study presents a model analyzing the investment decision of a CV firm. In 
order to establish in the market for a new technology, the firm invests and tries to recruit 
a star entrepreneur with an innovative idea and skill to implement a new venture. In 
addition, there is a VC in the same market for the new technology who wants to recruit 
the entrepreneur. The CV investment generates a marginal base return as well as an 
additional return from the new venture (venturing return) if successful. The venturing 
return depends on entrepreneurial effort, which the firm may elicit by setting incentives 
in the contract of the entrepreneur. The model determines the CV firm’s optimal ex-ante 
investment considering that there is competition for entrepreneurial talent.  
Only a few papers have addressed CV, particularly CV investment, theoretically. 
Most closely related, Bettignies and Chemla (2008) present a model on a firm’s choice 
of organizational form (corporation vs. CV firm). Similar to this model, the authors 
consider a setting where the firm and a rival investor (e.g., a VC) compete for the 
recruitment of a star manager with an innovative idea. In the main analysis, they compare 
the expected payoffs of the firm for the two options and conclude that firms prefer CV 
to organizing as a corporation in order to benefit from superior managerial incentives in 
new ventures, and to acquire new knowledge or talent. According to the authors, the 
model explains why CV is procyclical to entrepreneurial activity. However, the model 
cannot explain the very recent divergence of trends in CV and VC activity. Moreover, 
they do not model the investment decision of the firm explicitly but nevertheless predict 
that competition for entrepreneurs encourages CV investment. This prediction is to be 
taken with care in view of the fact that competition for talent creates pressure on 
expected payoffs of investors in the market. It seems quite conceivable that less expected 
payoffs translate to reduced investment volumes. In fact, the model developed in this 
study will yield an opposite prediction. 
This study is further related to Amador and Landier (2003), who consider a 
setting in which a manager chooses between contractual offers of a firm and a VC. The 
authors argue that the offer of the firm depends on the offer of the VC to the manager. 
The better the offer of the VC, the more the firm has to pay. Thus, the VC market exerts 
pressure on the firm, which affects the firm’s innovation effort. Anand et al. (2004) 
propose a model in which a corporation and a specialist compete for a talented 
individual, but focus on the different incentives of the two investors to acquire 
entrepreneurial knowledge. Corporations that incorporate the talent into the main line 
of business may benefit from the exploitation of synergies, whereas specialists who fund 
single projects provide stronger incentives and autonomy. Projects in which talent is 
pivotal might better be financed individually by specialists.  
The present study contributes to this literature by employing a similar setting, 
which is extended by an ex-ante investment decision made by a CV firm. The investment 
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provides the firm with an additional tool to elicit the desired effort by the entrepreneur. 
Remarkably, the results of the model yield an empirical prediction that is in contrast to 
previous theoretical literature, but is consistent with recent empirical observations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Sections 3 (Contracting) and 4 (Investment) contain the main analysis of the paper. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. Note that this paper is intended as a thought-provoking 
paper in the light of the results of Bettignies and Chemla (2008) and recent empirical 
observations, and does not claim to be a comprehensive analysis of the topic of CV 
investment. 
 
II. The Model 
 
The model is in the spirit of Bettignies and Chemla (2008). In the economy, there 
are a CV firm2 investing in a new technology, a rival investor (a female VC) who invests 
in the same technology3, and a star entrepreneur (male) with an innovative idea. Both the 
CV and the VC aim to recruit the entrepreneur to start a new venture with. The discount 
rate is normalized to 1. All players are risk-neutral. The timeline of events is illustrated 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Timeline 
This table provides the timeline of events.  
Date  t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 
Investment in the 
CV unit  
Contracting stage Entrepreneur 
exerts effort 
Realization of cash 
flows 
 
 
 
 
2 “CV”, “firm”, and “CV firm” refer to the same player in the model. A neutral gender is assigned to this 
player. 
3 The model does not endogenize the VC’s investment. This could easily be added, but would in no way 
change or enrich the qualitative results of the model. 
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At date t=0, the firm establishes a CV unit and invests. The investment 𝐼𝑐𝑣 ∈
(0, 1) comes at cost 
𝐼𝑐𝑣
2
2
. This cost can be considered as the cost of raising capital, which 
is increasing in the amount of capital provided to the CV unit. Alternatively, think of an 
effort incurred in monitoring the investment that is also increasing in the volume of the 
investment.4 The investment generates a marginal base return Π > 0 from the new 
technology.  
In addition to the base return, investing in the new technology generates a return 
from the new venture (venturing return) 𝜋 > 0 if the entrepreneur exerts effort. In 
particular, the venturing return is scaled by entrepreneurial effort 𝑒 ∈ [0, 1] at date t=2 
as well as the ex-ante investment, i.e. √𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝜋.
 5 The term √𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒 represents the probability 
that the venturing return will be generated. Thus, √𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝜋 is the expected venturing 
return. The cost of effort is given by 
𝑘
2
𝑒2. The parameter 𝑘 > 0 represents the marginal 
cost of effort. The structure of the expected venturing return captures that both the 
investment in the technology and the entrepreneur’s effort are crucial for venture success 
but entrepreneurial effort plays a stronger role. The return structure is the same for the 
VC (index 𝑣𝑐 instead of 𝑐𝑣). The expected return from the new technology is given by 
the base return plus the venturing return if the entrepreneur is recruited by investor 𝑖 ∈
{𝑐𝑣, 𝑣𝑐}: 
𝐼𝑖Π + √𝐼𝑖𝑒𝑖𝜋. (1)  
 
At date t=1, after the investment but before the entrepreneur’s effort, the 
entrepreneur pitches his idea to the CV and the VC. Both offer a contract to the 
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s compensation 𝑊𝑖, received from either the CV or the 
VC, comprises two components: a fixed base salary 𝑆𝑖 ≥ 0 and a share 𝛽𝑖 ∈ [0, 1] of 
the venturing return √𝐼𝑖𝑒𝑖𝜋. The non-negativity of parameters 𝑆𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 captures limited 
liability. Think of a compensation consisting of a fixed and a variable component.  The 
latter can be understood as stock options (calls) issued to the entrepreneur in order to 
incite his non-contractible effort. In fact, the entrepreneur’s participation 𝛽𝑖
∗ in the 
 
 
 
4 The convex nature of the cost function ensures that there will be an interior solution when solving the 
model. 
5 The square root √𝐼𝑐𝑣  serves for mathematical simplification. 
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venturing return will determine his effort choice 𝑒𝑖
∗. The superscript “∗” denotes 
variables’ equilibrium values.  
Moreover, when contracting with the entrepreneur, the firm discloses the capital 
provided to the CV unit, as this affects the contract and the entrepreneur’s effort. It is 
difficult to imagine an entrepreneur accepting an offer to implement an innovative idea 
within a firm without knowing in advance how much capital will be made available for 
it. In this respect, the timeline (investment before contracting and effort) seems to make 
sense in the light of reality.6 The timeline implies that the entrepreneur’s effort choice 
will not only respond to his participation 𝛽𝑖
∗ in the venturing return but also to the size 
of the investment 𝐼𝑖
∗ made by the CV or the VC. Consequently, the CV and the VC have 
two ex-ante tools to induce non-verifiable entrepreneurial effort 𝑒𝑖
∗. Note that the model 
does not consider the possibility of subsequent adjustments of the investment. 
The entrepreneur’s utility 𝑈𝑖 if recruited by 𝑖 is given by his compensation minus 
the cost of effort: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑊𝑖 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑖
2 = 𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖√𝐼𝑖𝑒𝑖𝜋 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑖
2. (2)  
 
III. Contracting 
 
At date t=1, both the CV and the VC offer a contract to the entrepreneur. 
Payoffs are contractible. The contract signed at date t=1 cannot be renegotiated. 
However, as is typical in the literature on contracting models in entrepreneurial finance 
research, the entrepreneur’s effort is non-verifiable in court and thus non-contractible 
(see, e.g., Anand et al. 2004, Bettignies 2008, Bettignies and Chemla 2008, Bettignies and 
Duchêne 2015, Casamatta 2003).  
The expected aggregate return from investment and recruitment of the 
entrepreneur depends on the entrepreneur’s best response in terms of effort at date t=2. 
Thus, the contracts offered by the CV and the VC at date t=1 also depend on the 
entrepreneur’s best response 𝑒𝑖(𝐼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖). Consequently, as the CV and the VC can only 
provide imperfect incentives to entrepreneurial effort, the first-best level of effort will 
not be achieved, but the second-best level of effort.  
 
 
 
6 In addition, this timeline facilitates the comparability of this model with the most closely related literature, 
which makes statements about CV investment before recruiting entrepreneurs. 
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Given that the CV and the VC compete for the entrepreneur’s talent, the CV’s 
(VC’s) offer additionally depends on the VC’s (CV’s) offer, which is expressed in the 
entrepreneur’s reservation payoff. As a result, the offers by the CV and the VC are sets 
of contracts {𝑆𝑖
∗, 𝛽𝑖
∗, 𝑒𝑖
∗} depending on the entrepreneur’s reservation payoffs 𝑈𝑣𝑐 and 
𝑈𝑐𝑣, respectively. Lemma 1 illustrates the set of contracts offered by the CV to the 
entrepreneur. The formal proof of Lemma 1 can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Lemma 1: 
The CV firm offers the following set of contracts to the entrepreneur: 
{𝑆𝑐𝑣
∗ , 𝛽𝑐𝑣
∗ , 𝑒𝑐𝑣
∗ } =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 {0,
1
2
,
√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2𝑘
} ∀ 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ∈ [0,
𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2
8𝑘
)  
{0,
√2𝑈𝑣𝑐𝑘
√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
,√
2𝑈𝑣𝑐
𝑘
} ∀ 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ∈ [
𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2
8𝑘
,
𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2
2𝑘
)
{𝑈𝑣𝑐 −
𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2
2𝑘
, 1,
√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
𝑘
} ∀ 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ∈ [
𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2
2𝑘
,∞)
. (3)  
 
𝑈𝑣𝑐 represents the reservation payoff of the entrepreneur, which he receives if 
recruited by the VC. As explained above, the entrepreneur’s compensation in the CV 
firm depends on the VC’s offer, expressed by 𝑈𝑣𝑐. As formally shown in the Appendix, 
there are three relevant areas. If the reservation payoff is relatively small (first area, first 
part of expression 3), the entrepreneur is able to extract rents from the venture. The CV, 
however, can elicit the desired effort by setting 𝛽𝑐𝑣
∗ =
1
2
 and paying no fixed salary. As 
the VC’s offer and thus the reservation payoff of the entrepreneur increases, the CV’s 
offer remains the same but the entrepreneur’s rent vanishes. If the reservation payoff is 
in the second area (second part of expression 3), the CV must increase the entrepreneur’s 
share of the venture returns to outbid the VC, which induces higher effort in favor of 
the CV firm. If the reservation payoff reaches the third area (third part of expression 3), 
the CV must pay a fixed salary in addition to the variable compensation that reaches 100 
percent to ensure that the entrepreneur participates. Note that, due to the symmetric 
payoff structure from the technology, the VC offers a similar set of contracts (only with 
swapped indices 𝑐𝑣 and 𝑣𝑐 in expression 3).  
The compensation structure illustrated above is in line with prior research (e.g., 
Amador and Landier 2003, Bettignies and Chemla 2008). The novel feature in this model 
is the explicit inclusion of the ex-ante investment. As mentioned above, the investment 
is made before contracting, as the entrepreneur’s decision with respect to the selection 
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of the investor (CV or VC) and his effort depend on the amount of capital provided. 
Therefore, as can also be seen in expression 3, the entrepreneur’s optimal level of effort 
𝑒𝑖
∗ is determined by the size of the ex-ante investment 𝐼𝑖. Intuitively, higher investment 
– higher capital provision to the entrepreneur’s venture – encourages entrepreneurial 
effort. In this respect, the contract structure extends previous research. 
Let us turn back to the contracting game. The only interesting scenario in this 
study is that the CV recruits the entrepreneur in equilibrium. Therefore, assume that, 
compared to the VC, the CV generates an additional benefit 𝜖 from recruiting the 
entrepreneur.7 An economic interpretation could be positive synergies or spillovers, 
which are typically incurred by large (multi-project) firms but not by (single-project) 
specialist investors (Anand et al. 2004, Bettignies and Chemla 2008). The new venture 
may generate positive externality on the CV firm’s main business (e.g., the main 
production line). As a result of such externality, the CV firm may want to invest and 
recruit the entrepreneur for both financial and strategic reasons. In contrast, the VC 
rather invests in single-project firms without positive spillovers on her main business.8 
In fact, VCs often invest for purely financial objectives whereas corporations usually 
pursue both financial and strategic goals (see, e.g., Chesbrough 2002, Covin and Miles 
2007, Dushnitsky 2011, Hellmann 2002, Ma 2020, Mathews 2006, Siegel et al. 1988). The 
strategic objective of the CV firm provides an additional incentive to recruit the 
entrepreneur. Moreover, the positive synergy effect captured by 𝜖 enables the CV firm 
to outbid the VC. However, in order to maintain (formal) symmetry between the CV 
and the VC in terms of payoff structures and thus contracts, let us assume that the 
additional benefit (spillover) is infinitely small, i.e. 𝜖 → 0.9 
 
 
 
 
7 Alternatively, one could assume that the entrepreneur will prefer the CV’s offer if the offered contracts 
are identical. 
8 Incidentally, it is questionable whether a VC has any kind of main business in the sense of a production 
line at all. 
9 Otherwise, if the payoffs of the CV and the VC were truly asymmetric in the sense that the CV firm’s 
investment and recruitment of the entrepreneur could generate substantial positive externality, the 
investment decisions made at date t=0 would be different across the CV and the VC. Consequently, the 
contracts offered at date t=1 would also differ, as would the entrepreneur’s choice of effort. This would 
increase the complexity of the contracting stage significantly, as the symmetry assumption facilitates the 
solution of the game at date t=1 (see the last part of the Proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix). Note that, 
for sake of simplicity, 𝜖 is omitted in all formulae as it is approaching zero. 
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Lemma 2:  
In the subgame equilibrium, the CV recruits the entrepreneur. The expected 
payoffs of the CV, VC, and entrepreneur are given by: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑣
∗ ) = 𝐼𝑐𝑣Π −
𝐼𝑐𝑣
2
2
 (4)  
𝐸(𝑃𝑣𝑐
∗ ) = 𝐼𝑣𝑐Π −
𝐼𝑣𝑐
2
2
 (5)  
𝑊𝑐𝑣
∗ = 𝐼𝑐𝑣
𝜋2
2𝑘
. (6)  
 
The formal proof can be found in the Appendix. This subgame equilibrium can 
be explained as follows. The expected recruitment payoff of the CV (VC) is determined 
by the expected base return and expected venturing return net of the entrepreneur’s 
compensation and investment cost. The no-recruitment payoff is given by the expected 
base return minus investment cost. The entrepreneur’s effort and compensation depend 
on his respective reservation payoff. From the CV firm’s perspective, the expected 
recruitment payoff is greater than the expected no-recruitment payoff if the reservation 
payoff 𝑈𝑣𝑐 is sufficiently small. Otherwise, the CV’s expected payoff is negative and the 
firm does not recruit the entrepreneur. Therefore, there is a threshold reservation payoff 
𝑈𝑣𝑐 to the entrepreneur, such that the expected recruitment payoff equals the expected 
no-recruitment payoff. Applying this logic to the VC yields the threshold reservation 
payoff 𝑈𝑐𝑣, at which the VC’s expected recruitment and no-recruitment payoffs are 
identical. If both the CV firm and the VC aim to recruit the entrepreneur, they outbid 
each other until one of them reaches the threshold payoff 𝑈𝑣𝑐 or 𝑈𝑐𝑣, respectively.  
The CV firm can offer a more attractive contract if 𝑈𝑐𝑣 ≤ 𝑈𝑣𝑐. In this case, the 
CV firm pays the entrepreneur his reservation payoff and recruits him, as the VC cannot 
outbid the CV. Otherwise, if 𝑈𝑐𝑣 > 𝑈𝑣𝑐, the VC recruits the entrepreneur. Given the 
symmetric payoff structure of the CV and the VC, they elicit the same effort by the 
entrepreneur. Due to the fact that the CV firm incurs a small positive externality from 
recruiting the entrepreneur and starting the new venture, the CV can offer a slightly 
better contract to the entrepreneur by surrendering the marginal spillover benefit. 
Therefore, in the subgame equilibrium, the CV recruits the entrepreneur.  
Note that, as illustrated in Lemma 2, the CV firm must actually convey the entire 
expected rents from the new venture, i.e. 𝐼𝑐𝑣
𝜋2
2𝑘
, to the entrepreneur (plus the positive 
externality 𝜖 → 0). Otherwise, the VC would recruit the entrepreneur by offering a more 
attractive contract. Therefore, consistent with Bettignies and Chemla (2008), 
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance  Volume 22, No. 1  Summer 2020   
 
 
69 
competition for the entrepreneur increases the firm’s compensation cost. This, however, 
mutes the CV’s investment objective related to the venturing returns. As a result, the 
CV’s expected payoff is solely determined by the expected base return. 
The assumption of the symmetric return structure between the CV and the rival 
investor (VC) is also used by Bettignies and Chemla (2008). This assumption significantly 
facilitates the formal analysis (see also Footnote 9 and Proof of Lemma 2 in the 
Appendix). In realty, the entrepreneur might face different situations when financed by 
the CV compared to the VC. However, technological symmetry does not imply that the 
framework conditions (pressure, influence, entrepreneurial freedom, independence, 
economic security, etc.) are identical for the entrepreneur, but that they are “equally 
good” in aggregate, so that the entrepreneur’s net incentive to exert effort is the same. 
More entrepreneurial freedom in the case of VC financing could be accompanied by 
greater pressure to succeed. If the entrepreneur implements the venture within the CV 
firm, he may have less entrepreneurial freedom or independence, but a better economic 
hedge in case the venture fails. This could result in a net incentive symmetry, which is 
simplified here by the symmetric payoff structure and thus the symmetric effort level 
chosen by the entrepreneur. 
 
IV. Corporate Venturing Investment 
 
With this preparation, let us turn to the CV’s investment at date t=0. To 
determine the optimal investment 𝐼𝑐𝑣
∗ , the CV maximizes its expected payoff considering 
the presence of the VC. 
 
Proposition 1:  
In an economy with an active VC, the CV firm only considers the marginal base 
return from investing. The venturing return does not affect CV investment. The optimal 
investment is given by: 
𝐼𝑐𝑣
∗ = Π. (7)  
 
Proof:  
The optimal investment is determined by the first order condition 
𝜕𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑣
∗ )
𝜕𝐼𝑐𝑣
= 0.  
 
Both the CV and the VC bid for the entrepreneur. Thus, there is competition 
for entrepreneurial talent, which enables the entrepreneur to extract the entire rent from 
the new venture. As a result, the investment incentive related to the venturing return 
disappears in the calculation of the CV. This means, the presence of a VC mutes the 
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financial investment incentive from the new venture. The CV therefore invests only for 
a weakened financial objective related to the base return and for a strategic objective 
related to the entrepreneur’s recruitment.  
In order to better understand the impact of competition for entrepreneurial 
talent on CV investment, let us see what happens if there were no active VC in the 
economy (superscript 𝑛𝑐 means no competition). 
 
Proposition 2:  
In an economy with no active VC, the CV firm and the entrepreneur split the 
expected venturing return, i.e.: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑣
𝑛𝑐) = 𝐼𝑐𝑣Π +
𝜋2
4𝑘
−
𝐼𝑐𝑣
2
2
 (8)  
𝑊𝑐𝑣
𝑛𝑐 = 𝐼𝑐𝑣
𝜋2
4𝑘
. (9)  
 
The optimal investment by the CV firm is affected positively by both the 
marginal base return and the expected venturing return:  
𝐼𝑐𝑣
𝑛𝑐 = Π+
𝜋2
4𝑘
. (10)  
 
Proof:  
The optimal contract can be easily determined by setting 𝑈𝑣𝑐 = 0 in expression 
3. The optimal investment is determined by the first order condition 
𝜕𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑣
𝑛𝑐)
𝜕𝐼𝑐𝑣
= 0. 
 
Recall that the presence of the VC reduces the CV firm’s expected profit from 
the new venture, as the CV and the VC compete for the entrepreneur. Competitive 
pressure results in higher compensation cost for the CV firm, which eventually translates 
into lower expected payoffs. Put differently, without competition for the entrepreneur, 
the CV firm can realize some (half) of the expected venturing return. This encourages 
investment. This yields the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1:  
The presence of a VC decreases CV investment, i.e.: 
𝐼𝑐𝑣
∗ − 𝐼𝑐𝑣
𝑛𝑐 = −
𝜋2
4𝑘
. (11)  
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Proof:  
The proof is straightforward from subtracting 𝐼𝑐𝑣
𝑛𝑐 from 𝐼𝑐𝑣
∗ .  
 
Lower expected payoffs weaken (mute) the financial incentive to invest related 
to the venturing return. What remains is the financial incentive from the expected base 
return and, in addition, the strategic incentive to recruit the entrepreneur and to invest. 
In a sense, this result contradicts Bettignies and Chemla’s (2008) argument that 
competition for talent encourages CV investment. In particular, their model predicts that 
competition for entrepreneurs resulting from activity of rival investors, such as VCs, 
encourages CV investment (see Prediction 2 on p. 518 in their study: “Stronger 
competition for talent should increase corporate venturing investment.”). In contrast, 
the present model predicts that stronger competition for entrepreneurial talent should 
decrease CV investment.  
This is a novel finding that extends previous research. It suggests that 
competition for talent may be the reason for the decoupling of trends in CV investment 
and VC activity, which has recently been observed empirically. The rationale can be 
summarized as follows: Competition for talent puts entrepreneurs in a better position 
when negotiating with investors, such as CV firms and VCs. Entrepreneurs must be 
offered higher compensation in order to recruit them successfully. If competition is 
fierce, entrepreneurs can extract the entire rent from the new ventures. In view of the 
fact that no profits can be made from engaging in new ventures, investors’ incentive to 
invest in such constellations is reduced. Consequently, less is invested. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
During most of history, CV activity has been procyclical to VC activity. There 
have been booms in VC investments entailing booms in CV investments in the late 
1960s, mid-1980s, and late 1990s. In the financial crisis years 2011 and 2012, this has 
changed. In fact, in those years, CV activity was still on the rise, whereas VC activity was 
on the decline. In the most recent years, both are rising again in terms of volume. 
However, growth in the CV sector is stronger. Motivated by this empirical observation, 
this study developed a model, which may explain the recent divergence or decoupling of 
trends in CV investment and VC activity. 
Consistent with previous research, the model demonstrates that VCs create 
competition for entrepreneurs, which eventually increases CV firms’ cost related to the 
recruitment of entrepreneurial talent (compensation cost). As a result, CV firms’ 
expected payoffs from venturing with newly recruited entrepreneurs decrease or may 
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vanish totally, as competition for talent enables entrepreneurs to extract higher rents 
from the ventures. This reduces the profitability of CV investment and thus weakens 
financial objectives to invest. However, CV firms might still have strategic investment 
incentives. Competition from VCs for entrepreneurial talent may be one factor that 
explains the recently observed decoupling of trends in CV investment and VC activity.  
Certainly, there are several coupling factors or effects, such as complementarity 
or spillovers among investments and R&D efforts, general sentiment in the market, or 
simply the entrepreneurial climate within the economy, which may at times outweigh the 
negative effect of competition for talent on CV investment. Additionally, VCs may also 
pursue strategic goals. This provides avenues for further theoretical research. 
Nevertheless, as suggested by this model, the encouraging effect of less competition for 
entrepreneurial talent from VCs on CV investment may be one major reason for the 
recent phenomenon that CV investment rises while VC activity is on the decline.  
The testable prediction derived from this model (Stronger competition for 
entrepreneurial talent should decrease CV investment.) contradicts the prediction made by 
Bettignies and Chemla (2008), and points to directions for future empirical research on 
CV investment and, in addition, on what may decouple the trends in CV and VC activity. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
The CV aims to maximize its net expected payoff from recruiting the entrepreneur: 
max
𝑒𝑐𝑣
𝐼𝑐𝑣Π + √𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑣𝜋 − (𝑆𝑐𝑣 + 𝛽𝑐𝑣√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑣𝜋) −
𝐼𝑐𝑣
2
2
. (12)  
 
The entrepreneur chooses effort level to maximize his expected utility: 
𝑒𝑐𝑣 ∈ argmax 𝑆𝑐𝑣 + 𝛽𝑐𝑣√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑣𝜋 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑐𝑣
2 , (13)  
 
subject to: 
𝑆𝑐𝑣 + 𝛽𝑐𝑣√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑣𝜋 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑐𝑣
2 ≥ 𝑈𝑣𝑐. (14)  
 
The entrepreneur’s optimal effort level is given by: 
𝑒𝑐𝑣 =
𝛽𝑐𝑣√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
𝑘
 
⟺ 𝛽𝑐𝑣 =
𝑘𝑒𝑐𝑣
√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
. 
(15)  
 
Substituting this into the CV’s objective function yields: 
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max
𝑒
𝐼𝑐𝑣Π + √𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑣𝜋 − (𝑆𝑐𝑣 + 𝑘𝑒𝑐𝑣
2 ) 
𝑒𝑐𝑣
∗ =
√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2𝑘
. 
(16)  
 
Hence, 𝛽𝑐𝑣
∗ =
1
2
 and 𝑆𝑐𝑣
∗ = 0 if 𝑈𝑣𝑐 <
𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2
8𝑘
. If, however, 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ≥
𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2
8𝑘
, condition 14 is 
violated. The CV increases 𝛽𝑐𝑣
∗ , thus 𝑒𝑐𝑣
∗ , such that the condition is satisfied again: 
𝑆𝑐𝑣 + 𝛽𝑐𝑣√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑣𝜋 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑐𝑣
2 ≥
𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2
8𝑘
, (17)  
 
if 𝑒𝑐𝑣
∗ = √
2𝑈𝑣𝑐
𝑘
, 𝛽𝑐𝑣
∗ =
√2𝑈𝑣𝑐𝑘
√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
, and 𝑆𝑐𝑣
∗ = 0. If 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ≥
𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2
2𝑘
, the firm can no longer ensure 
that condition 14 is satisfied through the incentive parameter, because increasing 𝛽𝑐𝑣
∗  
along with 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ≥
𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2
2𝑘
 would induce an inefficiently high effort by the entrepreneur. 
Instead, the firm pays a fixed salary 𝑆𝑐𝑣
∗ = 𝑈𝑣𝑐 −
𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
2
2𝑘
, which ensures that the condition 
is satisfied again. The variable compensation reaches its maximum possible value 𝛽𝑐𝑣
∗ =
1. This elicits the first-best effort 𝑒𝑐𝑣
∗ =
√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝜋
𝑘
. 
The contract offered by the VC is similar (only with swapped indices 𝑣𝑐 and 𝑐𝑣) due to 
the symmetric return structure.  
QED 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
The expected recruitment payoff of the CV is given by: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑣) = 𝐼𝑐𝑣Π +√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑣𝜋 −𝑊𝑐𝑣 −
𝐼𝑐𝑣
2
2
. (18)  
 
If the CV does not recruit the entrepreneur, its expected payoff is 𝐼𝑐𝑣Π −
𝐼𝑐𝑣
2
2
. Similarly, 
for the VC, we have the following recruitment payoff: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑣𝑐) = 𝐼𝑣𝑐Π𝑣𝑐 +√𝐼𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑣𝑐𝜋 −𝑊𝑣𝑐 −
𝐼𝑣𝑐
2
2
. (19)  
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If she does not recruit the entrepreneur, her expected payoff is 𝐼𝑣𝑐Π𝑣𝑐 −
𝐼𝑣𝑐
2
2
. Note that 
the entrepreneur’s effort 𝑒𝑖 and the compensation 𝑊𝑖 depend on his reservation payoff. 
From the firm’s perspective, the expected recruitment payoff is greater than the no-
recruitment payoff if the reservation payoff 𝑈𝑣𝑐 is sufficiently small, i.e. 𝑈𝑣𝑐 ≤ 𝑈𝑣𝑐. The 
weak inequality captures that the entrepreneur would choose the firm if indifferent. If, 
however, 𝑈𝑣𝑐 > 𝑈𝑣𝑐, the firm’s expected payoff is negative and the firm does not recruit 
the entrepreneur. Therefore, there is a reservation payoff to the entrepreneur 𝑈𝑣𝑐, such 
that the recruitment payoff equals the no-recruitment payoff. Replacing 𝑊𝑖 yields the 
following equation, which implicitly determines 𝑈𝑣𝑐: 
𝐼𝑐𝑣Π̂ + √𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑣(𝑈𝑣𝑐)𝜋 − 𝑈𝑣𝑐 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑐𝑣
2 (𝑈𝑣𝑐) −
𝐼𝑐𝑣
2
2
= 𝐼𝑐𝑣Π̂𝑐𝑣 −
𝐼𝑐𝑣
2
2
. (20)  
 
For the VC, the recruitment payoff equals the no-recruitment payoff if 𝑈𝑐𝑣 = 𝑈𝑐𝑣. If 
𝑈𝑐𝑣 < 𝑈𝑐𝑣, the VC recruits the entrepreneur. Otherwise, the VC does not recruit the 
entrepreneur. If both the CV firm and the VC bid for the entrepreneur, the CV firm can 
offer a more attractive contract if 𝑈𝑐𝑣 ≤ 𝑈𝑣𝑐. In this case, the CV firm offers contract 
𝑊𝑐𝑣 = 𝑈𝑐𝑣 and recruits the entrepreneur, as the VC cannot outbid the CV. Then, the 
firm’s expected payoff is given by: 
𝐸 (𝑃𝑐𝑣(𝑈𝑐𝑣)) = 𝐼𝑐𝑣Π𝑐𝑣 +√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑣(𝑈𝑐𝑣)𝜋 − 𝑈𝑐𝑣 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑐𝑣
2 (𝑈𝑐𝑣) −
𝐼𝑐𝑣
2
2
. (21)  
 
The payoff of the entrepreneur is 𝑊𝑐𝑣 = 𝑈𝑐𝑣, and the VC expects to receive the no-
recruitment payoff. If, however, 𝑈𝑐𝑣 > 𝑈𝑣𝑐, the VC offers 𝑊𝑣𝑐 = 𝑈𝑣𝑐 and recruits the 
entrepreneur. The VC’s payoff is: 
𝐸 (𝑃𝑣𝑐(𝑈𝑣𝑐)) = 𝐼𝑣𝑐Π𝑣𝑐 +√𝐼𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑣𝑐(𝑈𝑣𝑐)𝜋 − 𝑈𝑣𝑐 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑣𝑐
2 (𝑈𝑣𝑐) −
𝐼𝑣𝑐
2
2
. (22)  
 
The entrepreneur gets 𝑊𝑣𝑐 = 𝑈𝑣𝑐, and the firm expects to receive the no-recruitment 
payoff. Note that, by definition of 𝑈𝑐𝑣: 
𝐸 (𝑃𝑣𝑐(𝑈𝑐𝑣)) = 𝐼𝑣𝑐Π𝑣𝑐 +√𝐼𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑣𝑐(𝑈𝑐𝑣)𝜋 − 𝑈𝑐𝑣 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑣𝑐
2 (𝑈𝑐𝑣) −
𝐼𝑣𝑐
2
2
= 𝐼𝑣𝑐Π̂𝑣𝑐 −
𝐼𝑣𝑐
2
2
. 
(23)  
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Hence, 
𝑈𝑐𝑣 = √𝐼𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑣𝑐(𝑈𝑐𝑣)𝜋 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑣𝑐
2 (𝑈𝑐𝑣). (24)  
 
We can substitute this into the CV’s expected payoff and obtain: 
𝐸 (𝑃𝑐𝑣
∗ (𝑈𝑐𝑣)) = 𝐼𝑐𝑣Π𝑐𝑣 + 𝜋 (√𝐼𝑐𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑣
∗ (𝑈𝑐𝑣) − √𝐼𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑣𝑐
∗ (𝑈𝑐𝑣))
−
𝑘
2
(𝑒∗𝑐𝑣
2 (𝑈𝑐𝑣) − 𝑒
∗
𝑣𝑐
2 (𝑈𝑐𝑣)) −
𝐼𝑐𝑣
2
2
. 
(25)  
 
Given the symmetric payoff structure, the CV and the VC elicit the same effort by the 
entrepreneur. Thus,   
𝑈𝑐𝑣 = √𝐼𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑣𝑐(𝑈𝑐𝑣)𝜋 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑣𝑐
2 (𝑈𝑐𝑣) = √𝐼𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑣𝑐(𝑈𝑐𝑣)𝜋 −
𝑘
2
𝑒𝑣𝑐
2 (𝑈𝑐𝑣). (26)  
 
Given the assumptions in the text, the CV recruits the entrepreneur in equilibrium. This 
yields the expected payoffs given in Lemma 2 in the text.  
QED 
 
